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ARCHITECTURAL BARRIERS UNDER THE ADA: AN ANSWER
TO THE JUDICIARY'S STRUGGLE WITH TECHNICAL NON-
COMPLIANCE
When most people see a wheelchair, they see confinement, restriction
and depression. But a person with a mobility impairment' sees freedom, op-
portunity and hope.' Until recently, the American legal community failed to
characterize people with disabilities as a distinct group worthy of protection
and, as a result, disability-related discrimination went unchecked in our
communities.' Finally, some Congresspersons sought to establish a federal
law to enable persons with disabilities to be treated like those without dis-
abilities. When Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr.4 introduced the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1988 ("ADA of 1988") he quoted Dr. Henry Vis-
cardi, a former member of the National Council on the Handicapped ("Na-
tional Council"),' and stated:
I do not choose to be a common man. It is my right to be uncommon-if I
can. I seek opportunity-not security. I do not wish to be kept a citizen,
humbled and dulled by having the state look after me. I want to take the
calculated risk; to dream and to build, to fail and to succeed. I refuse to
barter incentive for a dole.... It is my heritage to stand erect, proud and
unafraid; to think and act for myself, enjoy the benefit of my creations and
to face the world boldly and say, this I have done. For our disabled mil-
lions, for you and me, all this is what it means to be an American.
6
Sandra Parrino, former chairperson for the National Council, stated:
Martin Luther King had a dream. We have a vision. Dr. King dreamed of
an America "where a person is judged not by the color of his skin, but by
1. Throughout this Comment the authors use examples of disabilities that relate to mobil-
ity impairments not as a way of narrowing the scope of this Comment's application but for
ease of writing. Therefore, when the reader comes across words or phrases relating to mobil-
ity impairments, such is meant to encompass disabilities generally and not to apply to mobil-
ity impairments exclusively.
2. Kenneth E. Behring, Help Someone Sit in the Sun, BYU MAG., Fall 2002, at 3.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2000).
4. Senator Weicker is the Senator who first introduced the ADA to the United States
Senate. Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., Historical Background of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
64 TEMP. L. REv. 387, 387 (1991) (citing 134 CONG. REc. S5106 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1988)).
For a more detailed discussion regarding his participation and his views regarding the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act see id.
5. The National Council on the Handicapped is currently called the National Council on
Disability. For general background and a history of the National Council see infra note 11.
6. Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., Historical Background of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
64 TEMP. L. REV. 387, 392 (1991) (quoting 134 CONG. REC. S5110 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1988)).
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the content of his character." [The] ADA's vision is of an America where
persons 7are judged by their ability and not on the basis of their disabili-
ties....
It was this spirit that led to the enactment of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). In a display of exuberance, the ADA has
been called the "20th Century Emancipation Proclamation for all persons
with disabilities."8 This characterization is not far from the mark. Whereas
the original emancipation proclamation, i.e., the Declaration of Independ-
ence, brought hope to a nation,9 the ADA has brought hope to persons with
disabilities, that they, like other Americans, may engage in the pursuit of
happiness unfettered by arbitrary and senseless restrictions.
But the best of intentions and the loftiest of virtues mean little if not
backed by the muscle of an enforcement mechanism. By and large, enforce-
ment of the ADA, similar to other civil rights laws, depends heavily on pri-
vate litigation.' In addition, the National Council on Disability" concluded:
With a 20 percent increase in workload resulting from the enactment of
ADA, the Equal Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") is slow in processing
complaints. The Department of Justice ("DOJ") is not investigating all the
complaints it receives and the Department of Transportation ("DOT") is
12
unable to track the complaints it receives....
Thus, in this first decade following the passage of the ADA, the courts
are inundated with ADA claims and have the responsibility for interpreting
and construing ADA's text.'3 The text of the ADA, unfortunately, has a
genuine need for judicial interpretation and construction due to ambiguities
7. Americans with Disabilities Act Joint Hearing on S. 2345 Before the Subcomm. on the
Handicapped of the Comm. of Labor and Human Resources, 100th Cong. 27 (1988) (state-
ment of Sandra Parrino, former Chairperson of the National Council on the Handicapped),
quoted in Carol J. Greenhouse, Ethnography and Democracy: Texts and Contexts in the
United States in the 1990s, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 175, 193 (2001).
8. 136 CONG. REC. 17,369 (1990) (statement of Sen. Tom Harkin).
9. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
10. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 n.6 (1979) (internal citations and
emphasis omitted).
11. The National Council on Disability was created by statute on February 22, 1984. 29
U.S.C. § 780(a)(1)(A) (2000). The National Council consists of 15 members who are "ap-
pointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." Id. §
780(a)(l)(A). Members are to have some relationship with a person with disabilities. Id. §
780(a)(1)(C). The National Council's purpose is to "promote policies, programs, practices,
and procedures that guarantee equal opportunity for all individuals with disabilities...
and... empower individuals with disabilities to achieve economic self-sufficiency, independ-
ent living, and inclusion and integration into all aspects of society." Id. § 780(a)(2).
12. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ACHIEVING INDEPENDENCE: THE CHALLENGE FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY. A DECADE OF PROGRESS IN DISABILITY POLICY SETTING AN AGENDA FOR
THE FUTURE (July 26, 1996), at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/achieving.html
(last visited Dec. 1, 2002).
13. Interview with Russell C. Handy, Attorney at Law, Center for Disability Access, in
San Diego, Cal. (Nov. 10, 2002) [hereinafter Handy interview].
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in its structure and language.' Congress, in passing the ADA, created a re-
markable recipe for disaster by passing a federal civil rights statute that ad-
dressed every single existing business in the nation, but failed to define one
of the key terms.'5 This failure to define key terms is an example of the am-
biguity that frustrates many practicing lawyers, judges and scholars.
With respect to existing facilities, the ADA defines discrimination as the
"failure to remove architectural barriers ... in existing facilities ... where
such removal is readily achievable. .,."6 This prohibition on discrimination
has far-reaching effects. Specifically, it means that the ADA does not have a
grandfather clause and the law applies not only to new construction, but to
existing facilities as well. 7 Amazingly, however, despite the tremendous
scope of this statute, neither Congress nor the DOJ 8 defined the term "archi-
tectural barrier."' 9
Thus, the courts are responsible for determining what constitutes an ar-
chitectural barrier. Ironically, there is no binding precedent as neither the
Supreme Court nor any circuit court has issued a published opinion defining
the term.2" The district courts' treatment of the issue, both in published and
unpublished decisions, lacks uniformity.2' The definitions urged by various
litigants are even more varied.22
This Comment examines the various approaches used to define this
ever-illusive term. First, because this issue is a matter of statutory construc-
tion, the authors discuss the history and background of Title III of the ADA
and the nature of its statutory scheme. Second, this Comment outlines the
various canons of statutory construction, namely plain language/textualism,
legislative history and agency deference. This section then applies the
above-mentioned canons of statutory construction and attempts to define ar-
chitectural barriers under Title III of the ADA, utilizing approaches courts
14. Matthew A. Stowe, Interpreting "Place of Public Accommodation" Under Title Il of
the ADA, 50 DUKE L.J. 297, 298 (2000).
15. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. (2000).
16. 42 U.S.C § 12182 (b)(2)(A)(iv).
17. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1), and 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(2), with 42 U.S.C. §
12182 (b)(2)(A)(iv).
18. The Department of Justice is the agency empowered to enforce the ADA. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12206(a)(1).
19. See 42 U.S.C § 12181; 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2002).
20. See infra note 101.
21. Compare Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1086 (D. Haw. 2000),
with Access Now, Inc. v. S. Fla. Stadium Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1367-68 (S.D. Fla.
2001), with Pascuiti v. New York Yankees, 87 F. Supp. 2d 221, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), with
Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment; Denying Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 7-8, Moreno v. Vineeraaj, Inc., (C.D. Cal. 2001) (No. 01-0363) (on file
with author), with Pickern v. Best Western Timber Cove Lodge Marina Resort, No. CIV.S-
00-1637 WBS/DA, 2002 WL 202442 at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2002), superceded in part by
194 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (E.D. Cal. 2002), with D'Lil v. Stardust Vacation Club, No. CIV-S-00-
1496DFL PAN, 2001 WL 1825832 at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2001).
22. Handy interview, supra note 13.
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have taken as examples. The second section also includes a critique of the
approaches taken by the courts, focusing specifically on the clarity and con-
sistency of the various approaches. Finally, this Comment recommends and
defends what the authors determine is the superior definitional scheme. The
authors propose a two-fold approach: (A) that defendants more rigorously
attack plaintiffs' standing in ADA Title III cases; and (B) that courts adopt a
rebuttable presumption with regard to what constitutes an ADA Title III bar-
rier, allowing courts to determine the propriety of plaintiffs' claims consis-
tent with the ADA's purpose.
I. ADA TITLE III HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
Places of public accommodation23 have historically discriminated
against persons with disabilities.24 This discrimination is not necessarily an
outright refusal to serve, nor to allow persons with disabilities in one's place
of business. If the term "discriminate" is thought of only in the common ver-
nacular, it can lead to a misunderstanding of its legal scope:
Although the term "discrimination" evokes images of active discrimina-
tion, e.g., a person is expressly forbidden to enter the premises because of
his or her disability, Congress also intended to eliminate more passive
forms of discrimination, e.g., a person is physically unable to enter the
premises because it lacks a wheel-chair accessible entrance. 25
Indeed Congress sought not only to prohibit deliberate discrimination
but also "to eliminate the effects of ... benign neglect, apathy, and indiffer-
ence."
26
Although the ADA gives people with disabilities hope that public ac-
commodations will comply with the law and remove physical barriers that
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) delineates the categories of facilities covered under Title III:
" Places of lodging.
" Establishments serving food or drink.
* Places of exhibition or entertainment.
" Places of public gathering.
* Sales or rental establishments.
" Service establishments.
" Stations used for specified public transportation.
" Places of public display or collection.
* Places of recreation.
" Places of education.
" Social service center establishments.
" Places of exercise or recreation.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3).
25. Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp 698, 706 n.1 (D. Or. 1997) (quot-
ing H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11) at 99 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 382 ("a
primary purpose of the ADA is to 'bring individuals with disabilities into the economic and
social mainstream of American life."')), supplemented by I F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Or. 1998).
26. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 335 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted).
[Vol. 39
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impede access, many facilities have not done so. This failure to comply with
the law has spawned numerous ADA Title III lawsuits. 7 For a plaintiff to es-
tablish a prima facie case under Title III of the ADA, (s)he must establish
that: (1) (s)he is disabled; (2) the defendant is a place of public accommoda-
tion; and (3) (s)he was denied full and equal enjoyment provided by the pub-
lic accommodation because of his or her disability.28
Finding a person disabled under Title III is generally met by proof of "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual."29 Determining whether a defendant's
business is a public accommodation is fairly straightforward because the
plain language of the ADA delineates the various types of places of public
accommodation.0 The discrimination requirement is more troublesome, as it
is difficult to determine whether the plaintiff has been denied full and equal
enjoyment of the public accommodation. Yet, the language of the statute
clearly states that it is discriminatory to fail to remove architectural barriers
when it is readily possible for the defendant to do so." Hence, the impor-
tance of a clear definition of architectural barriers is obvious.
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 began as nothing more
than a vague recommendation by the National Council." The recommenda-
tion was eventually taken to its logical next step and introduced to Congress
as a draft bill, the ADA of 1988."3 As oftentimes happens with proposed leg-
islation, the ADA of 1988 did not become law.3" However, a re-worded bill
with the same purpose was enacted into law and is known today as the
ADA. 5
27. Handy Interview, supra note 13.
28. Access Now, Inc. v. S. Fla. Stadium Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1363 (S.D. Fla.
2001).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000). As this Comment does not explore the myriad of
issues surrounding the definition of "disability" under the ADA, for a more thorough analysis
of such see Richard C. Dunn, Determining the Intended Beneficiaries of the ADA in the Af-
termath of Sutton: Limiting the Application of the Disabling Corrections Corollary, 43 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1265 (2002); and Rateb M. Khasawneh, Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.: Lim-
iting the Protections Available to Disabled Individuals Under the ADA, 29 CAP. U. L. REV.
761 (2002).
30. 42 U.S.C. §12181(7). For a more in-depth look at what constitutes a place of public
accommodation, see generally Stowe, supra note 14 and Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., "Equal
Members of the Community": The Public Accommodations Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 551 (1991).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).
32. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE 18 (1986).
33. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE 24-
39 (1988).
34. Weicker, supra note 6, at 392.
35. Id.
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A. Toward Independence: The ADA's Humble Beginnings
The ADA began as a twinkle in the eye of the National Council.36 In
1984, public law mandated that the National Council assess the state of af-
fairs for the disabled and recommend legislative proposals that would in-
crease incentives and eliminate disincentives to more fully integrate persons
with disabilities into society.37 The National Council reported its findings
and its recommendations are included in their report entitled, Toward Inde-
pendence .
The National Council found pervasive discrimination against people
with disabilities, including negative attitudes and a lack of physical accom-
modations.39 To remedy the social and physical discrimination society im-
posed on people with disabilities, the National Council issued forty-five leg-
islative recommended remedies to the pervasive disability-related
discrimination problem.' Among those forty-five recommendations were
five regarding equal opportunity laws.4' The overarching recommendation
regarding equal opportunity laws stated that "Congress should enact a com-
prehensive law requiring equal opportunity for individuals with disabilities,
with broad coverage and setting clear, consistent, and enforceable standards
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of handicap." 2
The National Council also suggested the law "provide a clear definition
and standards for applying the prohibitions of discrimination on the basis of
handicap" and "delineate specific enforcement standards, procedures, and
timelines for the implementation of equal opportunity requirements." 3 To
assist in providing these standards the National Council recommended that
the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board" ("Access
Board") be given the authority and responsibility to issue minimum guide-
36. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE 18 (1986).
37. Rehabilitation Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-221 § 142(b), 98 Stat. 17
(1984).
38. See generally NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE 1
(1986).
39. Id.
40. See generally id.
41. Id. at 11-13, 18-20.
42. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
44. The Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board ("Access Board")
was created in 1973 by section 502 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Access Board, A History of
the Board, at http://www.access-board.gov/about/boardhistory.htm (last visited Nov. 26,
2002). The Access Board was created in order to standardize compliance with the Architec-
tural Barriers Act of 1968 ("ABA"). Id. The Access Board in response to its mandate "devel-
oped accessibility guidelines that were to serve as the basis for standards used to enforce the
ABA." Id. These "standards" were later adopted by the "standard-setting agencies" and enti-
tled Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards. Id. It is certain that these accessibility standards
were instrumental in ensuring standardized compliance with the ABA.
[Vol. 39
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lines regarding accessibility." These guidelines are to set the standard for
"removal of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers in fa-
cilities, vehicles, programs, and activities covered by the equal opportunity
law for people with disabilities.""
B. The ADA of 1988: The Logical Next Step
To ensure the implementation of the National Council's recommenda-
tions Congress required the National Council to issue a progress report no
later than January 30, 1988.4" As a result of such monitoring, the National
Council issued On the Threshold of Independence."
On the Threshold of Independence took the recommendation of enacting
a comprehensive disability rights law a step further and gave birth to a draft
bill entitled "the ADA of 1988."' 9 Senator Weicker introduced this draft bill
via Senate Bill No. 2345 in the Senate"° and Representative Coelho intro-
duced a companion bill in the House via House of Representatives Bill No.
4498.51
Although the ADA of 1988 was never adopted into law some provisions
of the law are notable. First, the ADA of 1988 established as discriminatory
"the fail[ure] or refusal to remove; any architectural... barrier. 52 The ADA
of 1988 did not have different barrier removal requirements for facilities that
existed before the law came into existence and those subsequently built.
Second, although the text of the ADA of 1988 is clear in its mandate to re-
move architectural barriers, the provision empowering the Access Board
mandates it to issue minimum guidelines regarding architectural accessibility
without mention of the term "barriers."53
C. The ADA: Finally a Law is Born
In 1989, the ADA was reintroduced into both the House via House of
Representatives Bill No. 2273"4 and the Senate via Senate Bill No. 933.55 Al-
45. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE 21(1986).
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 502(b), 100 Stat.
1807 (1986).
48. See generally NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, ON THE THRESHOLD OF
INDEPENDENCE (1988).
49. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE 27 (1986).
50. 134 CONG. REC. 9375 (1988).
51. Id. at9605.
52. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988, S. 2345, 100th Cong. § 5(a)(2)(B) (1988) in
134 CONG. REc. 9380 (1988).
53. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988, S. 2345, 100th Cong. § 8(a) (1988) in 134
CONG. REC. 9381 (1988).
54. 135 CONG. REC. 8601 (1989).
55. 135 CONG. REC. 8505 (1989).
2003
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though the wording and structure of the ADA was substantially different
from the ADA of 1988, it shared the same general purpose.56 That purpose is
to "provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities. '"' In order to appro-
priately explain some of the differences between the two laws, a brief sketch
of the ADA is appropriate.
The ADA is divided into five sections, known as Titles. Title I specifi-
cally addresses discrimination in private sector employment. 8 Title II fo-
cuses on providing people with disabilities access to public programs and ac-
tivities,59 while Title III focuses on access to public accommodations.' Title
IV presents guidelines to ensure that people with disabilities enjoy full and
equal access to telecommunications." Finally, Title V addresses a number of
miscellaneous provisions.6" This Comment focuses on Title III-access to
public accommodations.
Within Title III, a number of provisions delineate the parameters of dis-
ability-related discrimination.63 Among the many forms of disability-related
discrimination is architectural discrimination, or in other words, the failure
to make public accommodations physically accessible to persons who are
disabled.' To provide instruction regarding structural accessibility, Congress
directed the Access Board to establish minimum guidelines to ensure archi-
tectural accessibility to buildings and facilities.' In addition, Congress
granted the DOJ power to assist entities covered under Title III in under-
standing their statutory responsibility.66
The Access Board promulgated guidelines entitled the Americans with
Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines ("ADAAG").6' The ADAAG is not
legally binding itself for ADA Title III purposes, but the DOJ adopted those
guidelines and renamed them the Standards for Accessible Design.68 These
56. Id.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000).
58. American with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 108, 104 Stat. 327
(1990).
59. Id. §§ 201-246.
60. Id. §§ 301-310.
61. Id. §§ 401-402.
62. Id. §§ 501-514.
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, 12183(a)(1),(2) (2000).
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), 12183(a).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 12204(a)-(b).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 12206(a)(1).
67. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A (2002)
68. Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., I F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 n.2 (citing 56 Fed.
Reg. 35605 (July 26, 1991)); 28 C.F.R. § 36.406(a) (2002). Although Standards for Accessi-
ble Design is the official name for the legally binding regulations regarding architectural ac-
cessibility requirements, many mistakenly refer to them as the ADAAG, which is not legally
binding. To avoid confusion, the remainder of this Comment refers to the Standards for Ac-
cessible Design as the Accessibility Standards.
[Vol. 39
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standards ("Accessibility Standards") "which are codified at 28 CFR Part 36,
App. A [] constitute legally binding regulation[s]."'69
The Accessibility Standards provide specific guidelines regarding the
structural accessibility of public accommodations."0 For example, the Acces-
sibility Standards explain the required minimum number of accessible park-
ing spaces at a public accommodation,7 the width of a van accessible park-
ing stall access isle,72 and even the specific slope of a curb ramp.73 The Code
of Federal Regulations specifically states that these technical architectural
requirements apply only to newly constructed and altered facilities,7" thereby
excluding their application to facilities already in existence.
The practical application of the Accessibility Standards raises a signifi-
cant difference between the ADA of 1988 and the ADA. The ADA, unlike
its 1988 counterpart, divides the ADA Title III structural requirements into
three categories: (1) new construction; (2) alterations; and (3) existing facili-
ties." Within these categories business owners have different responsibili-
ties.
New Construction. A newly constructed public accommodation is one
that is built after January 26, 1993.6 Title III requires that all newly con-
structed facilities be "readily accessible to and usable by individuals with
disabilities, except where an entity can demonstrate that it is structurally im-
practicable to meet the requirements of such subsection in accordance with
standards set forth or incorporated by reference in regulations issued under
this subchapter."77 The Accessibility Standards mandate that all new con-
struction meet specified requirements." It is well-settled law that any devia-
tion from the Accessibility Standards in new construction constitutes ADA
Title III discrimination, such that facilities not constructed up to, standard are
not readily accessible.79
Alterations. Alterations made by places of public accommodation after
January 26, 1992 must be "readily accessible to and useable by individuals
with disabilities" to "the maximum extent feasible.""0 The law simply re-
69. Indep. Living Res., 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1130 n.2.
70. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, at 1.
71. Id. at 4.1.2(5).
72. Id. at 4.1.2(5)(b).
73. Id. at 4.7.2.
74. Id. at 1.
75. Compare Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988, S. 2345, 100th Cong. § 5(a)(2)(B)
(1988) in 134 CONG. REC. 9380 (1988) with 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2000) and 42
U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1), (2) (2000).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1); 28 C.F.R. § 36.401(a).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1).
78. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, 4.1.1(1).
79. Cf United States v. Nat'l Amusements, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 251, 258 (D. Mass.
2001) (recognizing that compliance with the Accessibility Standards is sufficient to satisfy
Title III's new construction requirements) (citing Indep. Living Res., 982 F. Supp. at 746,
supplemented by I F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Or. 1998)).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(2); 28 C.F.R. 36.402.
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quires that if a physical facility is modified, altered or expanded, it must en-
sure that the area of modification or alteration or expansion comply with cur-
rent Accessibility Standards." In addition, funds must be set aside, if neces-
sary, to create accessible paths of travel of the altered area and accessible
bathrooms, telephones, and drinking fountains serving the altered area.82
Once again, the Accessibility Standards adopted by the DOJ determine what
is readily accessible and any deviation therefrom constitutes discrimination
under this provision of the ADA. 3
Existing Facility. An existing facility is any public accommodation not
required to comply with the ADA's new construction or alteration standards.
Since this category encompasses a majority of businesses in the United
States, the legal standard regarding architectural discrimination by existing
facilities is drastically different. For existing facilities, there is no readily ac-
cessible requirement, but the statute mandates "the remov[al] [of] architec-
tural barriers ... where such removal is readily achievable."" Barrier re-
moval is readily achievable if it is easily accomplished and can be carried
out without much difficulty or expense. "Determining whether the removal
[of any particular barrier] is readily achievable is a case-by-case judgment." 6
The factors the courts are to consider are: (1) the nature and cost of the re-
moval; (2) the overall financial resources of the owner; (3) the number of
persons employed at the site; (4) or any other impact of the action on the op-
eration of the site.87 The DOJ, in its implementing regulations, gives many
examples of measures that are likely readily achievable.88
President George Bush, upon signing the ADA into law, recognized that
the readily achievable standard "[gave] the business community the flexibil-
ity to meet the requirements of the [ADA] without incurring undue costs."89
The readily achievable standard limits a public accommodation's obligation
to remove barriers.' In addition, this lower standard only requires compli-
ance that can be achieved through minimal investment, thereby providing
businesses with a potential financial upswing from increased returns from
81. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(2).
82. Id.
83. Cf United States v. Nat'l Amusements, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 251, 258 (D. Mass.
2001) (recognizing that compliance with the Accessibility Standards is sufficient to satisfy
Title III's alteration requirements) (citing Indep. Living Res., 982 F. Supp. at 746, supple-
mented by I F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Or. 1998)).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
86. Michael J. Norton, The ADA: A Trap for the Unwary Building Owner, 23 COLO. LAW
1293, 1294 (June 1994).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
88. 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b) (2002).
89. See Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing S. 933, 26 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1165 (July 26, 1990), reprinted in BERNARD D. REAMS, JR. ET AL., DISABILITY
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT OF 1990 PUBLIC LAW 101-336, Doc. No. 9 (1992).
90. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, § 36.104 (2002)
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disabled persons now able to patronize the facilities.9 Thus, providing acces-
sible places of public accommodation is not just a benefit for persons with
disabilities, but also a benefit for businesses.
Although the readily achievable standard is flexible, it is important to
note that the rights of persons with disabilities are not compromised because
the removal of architectural barriers under the readily achievable standard is
a continuing duty.92 Consequently, people with disabilities can look forward
to fully and equally enjoying all places of public accommodation.
II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF ARCHITECTURAL BARRIERS: WHAT ARE
THEY?
Although Congress went to great lengths within Title III to define public
accommodation93 and readily achievable,9 ' courts have nonetheless struggled
to define these ambiguous legal terms,95 and, therefore, ADA Title III claims
are voluminous."' Architectural barriers, a key element in finding discrimina-
tion, was not statutorily defined and thus courts are left without congres-
sional guidance in interpreting its meaning. Predictably, district courts have
applied inconsistent standards in determining what constitutes an architec-
tural barrier. Surprisingly, however, neither legal scholars nor the circuit
courts97 have attempted to delineate its definitional boundaries. The debate
may be summed up as follows: What weight should be given to the Accessi-
bility Standards to determine the existence of an architectural barrier?
Should the Accessibility Standards be controlling, meaning that any physical
characteristic within a public accommodation that is not in strict compliance
with the Accessibility Standards is an architectural barrier? Or should the
Accessibility Standards just be used as a piece of the puzzle to determine the
existence of architectural barriers?
Since architectural barriers is a statutory term, the authors will analyze
its definition through common canons of statutory construction, which pro-
ceeds as a practical science.98 Practically speaking, there is a pecking order
of sorts when construing a statute. First, one must look at the plain language
of the statute to determine whether it is clear on its face. If the statutory text
is ambiguous, the legislative history may be examined to clarify congres-
sional intent. Finally, if Congress enables an agency to administer the stat-
91. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 66 (1989), reprinted in BERNARD D. REAMS, JR. ET AL.,
DISABILITY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 PUBLIC LAW 101-336, Doc. No. 2 (1992).
92. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, § 36.304 (2002).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2000).
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7),(9).
95. Stowe, supra note 14, at 298.
96. Handy interview, supra note 13.
97. See infra note 101.
98. EARL T. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 284 (1940) (citing SEDGWICK,
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 192 (2d ed.) (citations omitted)).
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ute, deference should be afforded to the agency's interpretation of statutory
terms. The authors will employ each of these canons to ascertain the range of
structural conditions that the term "architectural barriers" was intended to
encompass.
Application of the aforementioned canons in the federal court system
has presented two countervailing approaches. One approach suggests that
deviation from the Accessibility Standards should be dispositive in the de-
termination of an architectural barrier.99 The alternative approach, adopted by
a number of federal district courts, considers the Accessibility Standards to
be valuable guidance, a factor that is relevant, but not determinative." These
two approaches, and their variations, will be examined in detail with refer-
ence to the canon of statutory construction to which they adhere.
In addition, in order to understand the practical implications of the vari-
ous approaches the authors will provide a critique for each approach. Since
Congress expressly stated that the purpose of the ADA was to, inter alia,
"provide clear [and] ... consistent. . . standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities;"'' the criteria for this critique will be
clarity and consistency.
A. The Statute's Plain Language
The first avenue of statutory construction is the plain language of the
statute." 2 In. fact, the plain statutory language is often considered the most
persuasive evidence of a statute's purpose or meaning. 3 In the instance of
99. D'Lil v. Anaheim Hotel P'ship, No. 01-56547, 2002 WL 1759758, at *1 (9th Cir.
July 30, 2002) (unpublished). In D'Lil, the Ninth Circuit held that a condition that did not
comply with the Accessibility Standards constituted an architectural barrier. Id. The court was
specifically concerned with whether the lack of a roll-in shower at a hotel constituted an ar-
chitectural barrier. Id. In answering this question the court recognized the value in using the
Accessibility Standards and ultimately stated:
It is true that, as a general proposition, [the Accessibility Standards] appl[y] only
to new construction and to buildings undergoing alterations. However, [the Acces-
sibility Standards] requirement of roll-in showers in new buildings demonstrates
that the lack of roll-in showers is both a barrier and the kind of barrier the ADA
was intended to overcome. Otherwise, [the Accessibility Standards] would not re-
quire roll-in showers at all.
Id. Although not binding precedent, the only circuit court to weigh in on the matter recog-
nized that the proper definition for architectural barriers is the bright-line rule that any condi-
tion that fails to meet the Accessibility Standards is an architectural barrier. Id.
100. Access Now, Inc. v. S. Fla. Stadium Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1368 (S.D. Fla.
2001).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2000).
102. Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 193 (1985) ("In determining [what] Congress in-
tended. . ., we look first, as always, to the language of the statute.") (citing North Dakota v.
United States, 460 U.S. 300, 312 (1983)).
103. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) ("There is, of course,
no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legisla-
ture undertook to give expression to its wishes.") (quoting United States v. American Truck-
[Vol. 39
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clear, unambiguous statutory language, the plain meaning of the statute
mandates the judiciary's decision/ruling.' Proponents argue that the statu-
tory text is the most obvious and most objective way to interpret a statute,
especially in light of the malleability of legislative intent."5
Those supporting "textualist" theories will commonly fall into one of
two categories: (1) one who believes that a statute's language is presumed to
be accorded its plain meaning, absent compelling legislative history to the
contrary; or (2) one who believes that the meaning of the text is determined
solely through text-based or text-linked sources."6 The advantage of the for-
mer is that it combines guidance from the statutory text, but also incorpo-
rates the congressional intent in enacting the statute. The latter, some argue,
is more consistent with the rule of law, since it maintains separation of the
judicial and legislative powers.' 7
Unfortunately, the ADA's text does not provide much guidance in de-
fining architectural barriers. However, a reasonable inference may be drawn
with regard to the choice of terms Congress employed when identifying dis-
crimination in newly constructed or altered facilities as opposed to existing
facilities. When Congress defined accessibility with regard to newly con-
structed or altered places of public accommodation, it used the term readily
accessible.0 8 On the other hand, the provision that deals with existing facili-
ties employs the term architectural barriers whose removal is readily achiev-
able."° Had Congress desired to create uniformity, it could have utilized the
same terminology made applicable to all three types of public accommoda-
tions. Moreover, the extent to which Congress defined the readily achievable
term indicates its intent to hold owners and operators of existing facilities to
a significantly lesser standard."0 Thus, the plain language of the statute
shows that Congress indeed wished to create a different standard for deter-
mining the accessibility of an existing facility as compared to new construc-
tion and alterations.
ing Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940)).
104. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) ("The plain mean-
ing of legislation should be conclusive, except in the rare case [in which] the literal applica-
tion of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its draft-
ers."); Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)
("We begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for inter-
preting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative in-
tention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.").
105. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 223
(2000).
106. Id. at 224, 228.
107. Id. at 229.
108. 42 U.S.C § 12183 (2000).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9).
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B. Legislative History
Scholars and the legal practice have long recognized the importance of
legislative history in statutory construction.
It is established practice in American legal processes to consider relevant
information concerning the historical background of enactment in making
decisions about how a statute is to be construed and applied. This would
especially be true where there is no case law directly on point, or the statu-
tory language is inadequate or unclear. These extrinsic aids may show the
circumstances under which the statute was passed, the mischief at which it
was aimed and the object it was supposed to achieve. Although a court
may make and pronounce findings about the purpose of a statute, or the
mischief it was to remedy, without referring to its historical background,
knowledge of circumstances and events which comprise the relevant
background of a statute is a natural basis for making such findings."
The power of legislative history is evident, as the plain meaning of a
statute's text may be overcome by contradictory language or other strong
evidence contained in the statute's legislative background."2 Thus,
[w]hen the statutory language is clear, and there is no reason to believe
that it conflicts with the congressional purpose, then legislative history
need not be delved into, unless it is brought to the court's attention that
there is within the legislative history something so probative of the intent
of Congress as to require a reevaluation of the meaning of the statutory
language.3
Needless to say, the attempt to determine the legislature's intent is not
flawless but it is nonetheless a valuable method of statutory construction.
Tracking legislative history to determine the framers' intent regarding a par-
ticular issue in the statute may take many forms, specifically: (1) determin-
ing Congress' specific intent on the matter; (2) attempting to perform imagi-
native reconstruction; and (3) following the statute's general purpose, or in
other words, purposivism' This Comment will attempt to define architec-
tural barriers using each mode of legislative history.
111. NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.03 (6th ed.,
West Group 2000) (citations omitted).
112. Seidel v. Seidel, 752 F.2d 1382, 1385 (1985) (citing Tulalip Tribes of Wash. v.
FERC, 732 F.2d 1451, 1455 (9th Cir. 1984) and Heppner v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.,
665 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1981)).
113. Heppner, 665 F.2d at 871.
114. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 213-
14 (2000).
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1. Specific Intent
Looking to the drafter's specific intent is the most legitimate basis for
statutory interpretation under the intentionalist theories." ' But, to determine
the drafter's specific intent regarding a particular provision of a statute is
very difficult. In the case of the Title III of the ADA, Congress' specific in-
tent regarding the definition of architectural barriers is unclear at best. The
wealth of legislative information regarding debates and committee reports
focusing on Title III's readily achievable standard addresses the concerns for
the financial responsibilities of business owners in their barrier removal ob-
ligations, yet ironically, no mention is made as to what actually constitutes
an architectural barrier. Therefore, the specific intent regarding Congress'
definition of architectural barriers is realistically undefined.
2. Imaginative Reconstruction
The next method of legislative history is imaginative reconstruction.
Imaginative reconstruction is when one tries to discover "what the law-
maker meant by assuming his position, in the surroundings in which he
acted, and endeavoring to gather from the mischiefs he had to meet and the
remedy by which he sought to meet them, his intention with respect to the
particular point in controversy."" 6 In the case of the ADA, although there is
an awkward silence in the text of the legislative history regarding what con-
stitutes an architectural barrier, courts have nonetheless used their imagina-
tion to reconstruct Congress' intent regarding architectural barriers. This ap-
proach may be referred to as the valuable guidance approach."7
The valuable guidance approach states that the Accessibility Standards
may be one factor taken into consideration in determining whether an archi-
tectural barrier exists, but refuse to conclude that failure to strictly comply
with the Accessibility Standards is an architectural barrier per se.1" "Even
though only new construction and alterations must comply with the [Acces-
sibility] Standards, those [Accessibility] Standards nevertheless provide
115. Id. at 214.
116. Id. at 218-19 (citing Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379,
381 (1907)).
117. The authors use the "valuable guidance" approach to encapsulate the thread of simi-
larity of the various district courts' opinions on the subject; that being the Accessibility Stan-
dards should be used as "valuable guidance." Pickern v. Best Western Timber Cove Lodge
Marina Resort, No. CIV-S-00-1637 WBS/DA, 2002 WL 202442, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18,
2002), superceded in part by 194 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2002); D'Lil v. Stardust Vaca-
tion Club, No. CIV-S-00-1496DFL PAN, 2001 WL 1825832, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2001);
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment at 7-8, Moreno v. Vineeraaj, Inc., (C.D. Cal. 2001) (No. 01-0363) (on file with author);
Access Now, Inc. v. S. Fla. Stadium Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1367-68 (S.D. Fla. 2001);
Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1086 (D. Haw. 2000); Pascuiti v. N.Y.
Yankees, 87 F. Supp. 2d 221, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
118. Pascuiti, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 226; Access Now, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1367.
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valuable guidance for determining whether an existing facility contains ar-
chitectural barriers....9 This view has been adopted by a number of courts
who have determined that:
Deviation from the [Accessibility Standards] is relevant but not determina-
tive; it is one consideration from which the court may conclude that non-
compliance impedes access. At trial, a defendant may be able to rebut this
evidence by showing that despite the technical non-compliance, the chal-
lenged accommodation in fact allows disabled persons effective access.1
20
A reason for this soft standard is the courts' fear of holding businesses
liable for technical non-compliance with the Accessibility Standards.'
Courts have reasoned that "[i]n certain instances, injunctive relief may not
be appropriate for violations of [Accessibility Standards] that are deemed to
be de minimis.... Such de minimis violations do not materially impair the
use of an area for its intended purpose, nor does it pose any apparent danger
to persons with disabilities.' 2
In articulating this valuable guidance approach to defining architectural
barriers, the courts appear to conflate the propriety of a plaintiff's claim with
the existence of an architectural barrier. Specifically, the ADA creates a duty
for business owners to remove architectural barriers commensurate with the
business' financial wherewithal.2 3 A logical inference from the statutory
language is that an architectural barrier is not determined by who encounters
the barrier because, if that were the case, business owners would be left with
no guidance on how to prevent architectural discrimination and therefore
discharge their duty under the ADA. Nonetheless, courts adopting the valu-
able guidance approach strain to point out that the plaintiff must show that
the facility contained barriers that hindered his or her access.'" In essence,
the plaintiff has to prove that the alleged barrier subjectively hindered his or
her full use and enjoyment of the facility. Thus, the courts conclude that the
existence of an architectural barrier is a material issue of fact and must be
determined by the jury on a case-by-case basis.'25
119. Pascuiti, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 226 (emphasis added).
120. Access Now, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1368.
121. Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1086 n.26 (D. Haw. 2000).
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2000).
124. Moreno, at 8 (citing D'Lil v. Stardust Vacation Club, No. CIV-S-0O-1496DFL
PAN, 2001 WL 1825832, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2001)) (emphasis added).
125. Moreno, at 8. See also Pickern, 2002 WL 202442, at *3 ("the mere fact that motel
bathrooms did not meet [Accessibility Standards] spatial requirements was insufficient to
grant summary judgment for plaintiff"), superceded in part by 194 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (E.D.
Cal. 2002).
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3. Practical Significance
The valuable guidance approach is attractive because it does not hold an
existing facility to the rigid requirements of the Accessibility Standards and
appears to follow the congressional intent to lower the standard for existing
facilities. However, this approach lacks both clarity and consistency. Under
this approach, whether an existing facility contains barriers is determined not
necessarily by what the regulatory agency has determined is readily accessi-
ble, but instead by who actually encounters the barrier and whether or not his
or her access was truly impeded. Therefore, although courts that apply the
valuable guidance approach appear to do so to protect defendants from being
held liable for technical non-compliance, this approach leaves defendants
unsure as to how to discharge their duty or, in other words, how to protect
themselves from ADA Title III liability. In addition, the valuable guidance
approach cuts both ways. Specifically, since plaintiffs may not use the Ac-
cessibility Standards as conclusive proof to establish the existence of a bar-
rier, neither can defendants argue that compliance with the Accessibility
Standards is per se proof that a particular condition is not a barrier. This lack
of clarity hinders both potential plaintiffs and defendants.
Although this approach seems to be gaining favor among courts today,
policy considerations raise concern about the lack of consistency in rulings
that could result from such a position. By determining what constitutes a
barrier on a case-by-case analysis, the valuable guidance approach allows for
two exact conditions to exist in two different jurisdictions where one is a
barrier while the other is not. A case-by-case determination of an architec-
tural barrier is certain to provide inconsistent rulings among the courts.
C. Agency Deference
When the statute itself enables an agency to assist in the statute's ad-
ministration,
[the] view of the agency charged with administering the statute is entitled
to considerable deference; and to sustain it, we need not find that it is the
only permissible construction that [the agency] might have adopted but
only that [the agency's] understanding of this very "complex statute" is a
sufficiently rational one to preclude a court from substituting its judgment
for that of [the agency].1 6
Thus, when Congress implicitly or explicitly leaves statutory gaps, it of-
ten empowers an administrative agency to formulate policies and regulations
to fill those gaps.'27 Specifically, when Congress enacted the ADA, it left a
126. Chemical Mfg. Assn. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985)
(citing Train v. Nat'l Res; Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 75, 87 (1975)).
127. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
(internal quotations omitted).
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mandate to the DOJ to assist entities in understanding their statutory respon-
sibilities.28 Therefore, the regulations promulgated by the DOJ are control-
ling unless the regulations are arbitrary, capricious or patently contrary to the
statute. 29
In response to the congressional mandate, the DOJ created the Accessi-
bility Standards for newly constructed and altered facilities. The DOJ spe-
cifically required newly constructed facilities and alterations made to facili-
ties to be in full compliance with the Accessibility Standards. 3 Conversely,
no such prerequisite was made for existing facilities other than the express
requirement that architectural barriers be removed if readily achievable. 3 '
Therefore, one may note that inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (inclusion
of one thing is the exclusion of another). By specifically requiring newly
constructed and altered facilities to comply with the Accessibility Standards,
the DOJ was well aware of this standard and could have made it a universal
requirement for existing facilities as well. Thus, it appears that use of the
Accessibility Standards as the threshold for defining an architectural barrier
in an existing facility is inconsistent with the apparent position taken by the
DOJ, the agency empowered to regulate the ADA.
Undoubtedly, the rationale for this distinct standard was to minimize the
financial burden on owners and operators of existing places of public ac-
commodation. For example, the Accessibility Standards require that door-
ways in such facilities have a minimum clear opening of 32 inches."3 Satis-
faction of this requirement is easily accomplished in a building constructed
after enactment of the ADA, as architects and contractors, aware of this re-
quirement, will ensure that the doorways are of the appropriate width while
the building is still in the planning stages. Conversely, the widening of a
doorway in a place of public accommodation already in existence could re-
quire an enormous expense to a business owner who may not have the finan-
cial wherewithal to accommodate such a change. Thus, the significantly
lower standard for existing facilities is clearly justified.
As this position is consistent with the valuable guidance approach, this
section will not reiterate the above-mentioned critique.
However, this does not seem to be the only approach taken by the DOJ.
Some note that it is unnecessary to deviate from the Accessibility Standards
when defining architectural barriers because the readily achievable prerequi-
site lowers the standard for compliance as Congress desired.'33 "It is the
'readily achievable' requirement, defined as 'easily accomplishable and able
to be carried out without much difficulty or expense,' that provides the lesser
128. 42 U.S.C. § 12206(a)(1) (2000).
129. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 844.
130. 28 C.F.R. § 36.406 (2002).
131. 28 C.F.R. § 36.304.
132. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, 4.13.5.
133. Pascuiti v. N.Y. Yankees, 87 F. Supp. 2d 221, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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standard for existing facilities under Title III."'" 4 Therefore, given the addi-
tional obligation of the barrier removal as being readily achievable, it is pos-
sible to define architectural barriers as any condition that deviates from the
Accessibility Standards, and still be consistent with the intent to provide for
different standards for existing facilities and new construction.
This position is advocated by at least one representative of the DOJ. In
Pascuiti v. New York Yankees,'35 an Assistant U.S. Attorney ("AUSA") indi-
cated its position with regard to the architectural barrier definition in a letter
to the defendant:
Under the ADA, existing facilities are obligated to bring their facilities as
close to compliance with the Standards as is readily achievable. Therefore,
we consider any element in a facility that does not meet or exceed the re-
quirements set forth in the [Accessibility] Standards to be a barrier to ac-
cess. 136
If this statement is indeed DOJ's position, it should be afforded defer-
ence when determining what constitutes an architectural barrier under Title
III. In fact, district courts have cited to this letter in their conclusion that the
DOJ has adopted this position.'37 However, careful scrutiny of this AUSA's
letter shows that the courts have incorrectly applied the law in equating the
position of DOJ counsel with an official position by the DOJ.
An agency's interpretation is not necessarily unworthy of deference
simply because it is made the form of a legal brief.' However, the Supreme
Court has generally declined to "give deference to an agency counsel's in-
terpretation of a statute where the agency itself has articulated no posi-
tion." '' The Court's rationale rests on the ground that the administrative
agency, not its counsel, is responsible for articulating and enforcing statutory
command."4 Furthermore, agency interpretations that are not subject to pub-
lic notice and comment procedures, such as the letter to the defendants in
Pascutti, are not afforded substantial deference.' Instead, the "interpreta-
tions contained in informal formats are entitled to respect, but only to the ex-
tent that those interpretations have the power to persuade."'4 2 Therefore, a
letter by an AUSA should not be equated to an official position by the DOJ.
134. Id. (internal citations omitted).
135. 87 F. Supp. 2d 221.
136. Letter from Robert W. Sadowski, Assistant United States Attorney, to John C.
Lawn, Vice President and Chief of Operations, Yankees Baseball, and Marjorie A. Cadogan,
General Counsel, City of New York Parks Department (Apr. 8, 1988) at 3 (on file with au-
thor).
137. See, e.g., Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1086 (D. Haw. 2000).
138. Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp. v. Thompson, 297 F.3d 273, 282 (3d Cir. 2002).
139. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988).
140. Id.
141. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 147 F. Supp. 2d
1130, 1135 (C.D. Ut. 2001).
142. Id. (internal quotes omitted).
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In addition, the DOJ's actions subsequent to the enactment of the ADA
indicate that it did not intend for existing facilities to be held to the Accessi-
bility Standards. The ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual defines ar-
chitectural barriers as "physical elements of a facility that impede access by
people with disabilities,"'' 3 but says nothing to indicate that it believes any
condition that is not compliant with the Accessibility Standards to be an ar-
chitectural barrier. Even more convincing, the DOJ states in the ADA Guide
for Small Businesses that "[i]n evaluating what barriers need to be removed,
a business should look to the [Accessibility Standards] as a guide."'" The
authors made numerous attempts to contact DOJ officials to determine the
their official position, but such contacts were fruitless, as the authors discov-
ered a myriad of discrepancies.' 5 Therefore, it is highly unlikely that one
could conclusively state that the official position of the DOJ is that any non-
compliance with the Accessibility Standards constitutes a barrier under Title
III.
Moreover, the preamble to the DOT's regulations states, "[i]n striking a
balance between guaranteeing access to individuals with disabilities and rec-
ognizing the legitimate cost concerns of businesses and other private entities,
the ADA establishes different standards for existing facilities and new con-
struction."'46 Thus, this approach is wholly inconsistent with the ADA to de-
fine an architectural barrier at an existing place of public accommodation as
being any condition that does not meet all the Accessibility Standard re-
quirements.
1. Practical Significance
Although it is doubtful that the DOT's official position is to hold exist-
ing facilities to the rigid Accessibility Standards, such a position is valuable
from a policy standpoint because of the clarity this bright-line rule estab-
lishes for both courts and the parties. Business owners would benefit because
they would know precisely what barriers must be removed from their prem-
ises in order to immunize themselves from liability. Similarly, disabled per-
sons would know that they could not bring an action against a business that
143. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ADA TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL 111-4.4100
(1993), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/taman3.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2002).
144. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ADA GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESSES 3 (1999), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/smbusgd.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2002) (emphasis added).
145. Compare Telephone Interview with Janet Blizard, Supervisory Attorney, Public
Access Section, Department of Justice (Nov. 5, 2002) (stating that the Accessibility Standards
can be looked to for guidance, but ultimately, the existence of an architectural barrier must be
viewed on a case-by-case basis and must be a qualitative analysis with emphasis placed on the
effect of the barrier on the plaintiff) with Telephone Interview with Robert Sadowski, Assis-
tant U.S. Attorney, Department of.Justice (Oct. 15, 2002) (stating that any non-conformity
with the Accessibility Standards is a barrier to access).
146. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, § 36.304 (2002).
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was in compliance with the Accessibility Standards, even if the architectural
barriers nonetheless impeded their access.
Furthermore, such a position would facilitate consistency in court rul-
ings, at least with respect to the definition of architectural barriers. Specifi-
cally, an alleged van-accessible parking stall with a 72-inch access isle as
opposed to the Accessibility Standard's required 96-inch access isle' 7 would
be an architectural barrier in New York, Tennessee, Wisconsin and Califor-
nia regardless of the person who encountered the condition. It is important to
note that just because courts find a particular condition constitutes a barrier,
that does not mean failure to remove such is discriminatory. The relief valve
Congress provided to alleviate the burden on existing facilities was the read-
ily achievable clause.'" Hence, allowing courts to render consistent rulings
would not increase the burden on business owners as they would only be re-
quired to remove the barriers if doing so is readily achievable for that par-
ticular business.' 49
Not only would this standard facilitate consistency in legal battles but it
would also assist the DOJ in achieving its goal of voluntary compliance with
the ADA.' By instituting a bright line standard owners of public accommo-
dations are clear as to what constitutes a barrier and can better anticipate po-
tential litigious conflicts and remove such barriers.' -'
147. Id. pt. 36, app. A, 4.1.2(5)(b).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2000).
149. id.
150. U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE, supra note 143, at 2.
151. This approach is not as strict as it may appear at first impression. For example, sec-
tion 2.2 of the Accessibility Standards provides that "[d]epartures from particular technical
and scoping requirements of this guideline by the use of other designs and technologies are
permitted where the alternative designs and technologies used will provide substantially
equivalent or greater access to and usability of the facility." 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, 2.2
(emphasis added). This provision, as traditionally applied to new construction, gives archi-
tects the flexibility to design facilities that may not strictly comply with the Accessibility
Standards but nonetheless provide equivalent facilitation. Telephone Interview with Beth
Stewart, Deputy Council for the Access Board (Oct. 25, 2002). Indeed, when "[p]roperly
read, the 'Equivalent Facilitation' provision does not allow facilities to deny access under cer-
tain circumstances, but instead allows facilities to bypass the technical requirements laid out
in the [Accessibility] Standards when alternative designs will provide 'equivalent or greater
access to and usability of the facility."' Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entm't Ctr. at the
Waterfront, 193 F.3d 730, 739 (3d Cir. 1999). Although this provision provides flexibility it
does not prevent strict compliance, as many of the Accessibility Standards are not susceptible
to equivalent facilitation. Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 727-28 (D.
Or. 1997) supplemented by I F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Or. 1998).
For the same reasons mentioned above, this provision of the Accessibility Standards
would provide flexibility in what business owners are required to remove as architectural bar-
riers in existing facilities so long as there is equivalent facilitation. Thus, if an owner of an
existing facility can show that, although a condition on his premises may technically violate
the Accessibility Standards, it is not a barrier because it provides equivalent facilitation to the
facility.
Similarly, section 3.2 of the Accessibility Standards provides that "[a]ll dimensions are
subject to conventional building industry tolerances for field conditions." 28 C.F.R. pt. 36,
app. A, 3.2 (2002). "Construction tolerances may be defined as the permitted variations from
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS-STANDING AND A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
None of the aforementioned definitional approaches to what constitutes
an architectural barrier strikes the delicate balance, required to meet the
ADA's goals, namely to provide a clear, consistent and enforceable standard
of discrimination under Title III of the ADA. Nevertheless, the authors be-
lieve this balance can be attained through a two-pronged approach. First,
courts should more rigorously apply the doctrine of standing, a doctrine in-
frequently utilized in ADA causes of action.'52 To understand how the doc-
trine of standing will help courts to ferret out illegitimate claims involving
purely technical non-compliance the authors will undertake a brief explana-
tion of standing under the ADA. Second, courts should apply a rebuttable
presumption to the definition of architectural barriers. The presumption be-
ing that a physical condition that fails to meet the requirements of the Acces-
sibility Standards constitutes an architectural barrier. The authors then sug-
gest how defendants may rebut this presumption.
A. Standing Under the ADA
Similar to all other federal cases, an ADA cause of action requires that a
plaintiff have standing to sue.'53 In other words, the disabled person must
suffer an injury in fact, which must be causally connected to the defendant's
action, and that injury must be redressed by a judgment in the plaintiff's fa-
vor.'54 Because injunctive relief is the sole remedy under Title III of the
ADA, the plaintiff must also show a real and immediate threat of future in-
jury. ' This requirement can be reduced to the plaintiff showing that (s)he
had definite plans to return to the place of public accommodation, such as a
frequently visited restaurant. "6
given dimensions, locations, or alignments, based on field, material, manufacturing, and
workmanship conditions." Access Now, Inc. v. Ambulatory Surgery Ctr., No.
99109CIVSEITZ/GARBER, 2001 WL 617529 *3 (S.D. Fla. May 2, 2001). This section rec-
ognizes that de minimis tolerances must be made for basic installation or construction of fa-
cilities. Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1086 (D. Haw. 2000); Indep. Liv-
ing Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., I F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1153 (D. Or. 1998). Thus, if a plaintiff
argues that he was discriminated against because a ramp was too steep, as it failed to meet the
width requirements of the Accessibility Standards; the defendant may be able to nonetheless
demonstrate compliance with the Accessibility Standards by showing that the discrepancy is
due to conventional building industry tolerances.
152. Amy F. Robertson, Standing to Sue Under Title III of the ADA, 27 COLO. LAW 51,
51 (Mar. 1998) (noting that standing is raised only rarely in Title 1II cases).
153. Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2001).
154. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
155. Access Now, Inc. v. S. Fla. Stadium Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1364 (S.D. Fla.
2001).
156. Bird v. Lewis & Clark Coll., 303 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that
the plaintiff lacked standing to sue under Title Ill of the ADA because she did not "allege[ I
that she plan[ned] to return"); Shotz, 256 F.3d at 1081 (explaining that because plaintiffs nei-
ther attempted to return nor alleged a desire to do so in the future they lacked standing to
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1, Actual Knowledge and Futile Gestures
As a preliminary matter, it is important to understand that Congress did
not intend to limit a plaintiffs right to sue for only those barriers (s)he actu-
ally and physically encountered. 5' Instead, the ADA allows plaintiffs to seek
an injunction for those barriers not encountered, but only "if such person has
actual notice that a person or organization covered by this subchapter does
not intend to comply with its provisions." 8 Furthermore, the barrier must be
within the class of barriers that affect that person's disability. For example,
in Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn Restaurant,'59 the court allowed the plaintiff to
prevail and enjoin the defendant for architectural barriers related to his spe-
cific disability because the plaintiff had both encountered certain barriers
personally, and had an actual knowledge of the existence of other violations
throughout the facility."w Moreover, courts have extended standing to cover
all areas with barriers that a plaintiff might encounter in a given facility. 6 '
"To hold otherwise would be piecemeal compliance. To compel a building's
ADA compliance, numerous disabled plaintiffs, each injured by a different
barrier, would have to seek injunctive relief as to the particular barrier en-
countered until all barriers had been removed. This not only would be ineffi-
cient, but impractical."' 2
However, other courts have cautioned against a broad reading of the
standing doctrine in ADA cases. 63 These courts are careful to point out that a
plaintiff is not entitled to seek relief from violations of the ADA about which
they lack actual knowledge."
bring an ADA Title III cause of action); Hoepfl v. Barlow, 906 F. Supp. 317, 320 (E.D. Va.
1995) (stating that "because [the plaintiff] now resides in a different state, it is highly unlikely
that she will ever again be in a position where any discrimination by [the defendant] against
disabled individuals will affect her personally" and therefore the plaintiff lacked standing).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (2000).
158. Id.
159. 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065
160. Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1081-82 (D. Haw. 2000). See
also Steger v. Franco, 228 F.3d 889, 894 (8th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a disabled person
need not encounter all existing barriers to obtain effective relief so long as the plaintiff en-
countered some barrier to access when visiting the facility).
161. Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 762 (D. Or. 1997) sup-
plemented by 1 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Or. 1998).
162. Pickern v. Best Western Timber Cove Lodge Marina Resort, No. CIV.S-00-1637
WBS/DA, 2002 WL 202442 *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2002) (citing Indep. Living Res., 982 F.
Supp. at 762) superceded in part by Pickern v. Best Western Timber Cove Lodge Marina Re-
sort, 194 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
163. Access Now, Inc. v. S. Fla. Stadium Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1365 (S.D. Fla.
2001). See also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 n.6 (1996).
164. Access Now, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1365 ("Courts in this Circuit addressing the
issue have consistently refused to grant injunctive relief absent evidence that the plaintiff ac-
tually suffered -and will again suffer -- discrimination in violation of Title II1.").
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Courts nonetheless agree that plaintiffs do not have standing to sue for
barriers that are unrelated to the plaintiff s disability.'65 For example, a blind
person would not be able to recover for architectural barriers that would only
be a barrier to a person who is unable to ambulate and is required to be in a
wheelchair.
Although Congress may, by legislation, expand standing to the fullest ex-
tent permitted by Article III, . . . in no event, . . may Congress abrogate
the Article III minima: A plaintiff must always have suffered "a distinct
and palpable injury to himself," .. that is likely to be redressed if the re-
quested relief is granted.'6
To allow plaintiffs to sue for non-related barriers would call into ques-
tion the injury in fact requirement, since the disabled person did not suffer
discrimination as a result of the barrier. To put it nicely, "[a] disabled person
cannot vindicate the rights of disabled persons generally.' 67
2. Standing-An Answer to Technical Non-Compliance
Courts' reluctance to require existing facilities to strictly comply with
the Accessibility Standards is a result of the courts' concern of leaving busi-
ness owners open for potential claims for technical non-compliance.'68
One solution to the ever-present contest between cries of technical non-
compliance and the importance of clear guidelines is found within traditional
Article III standing requirements. Perhaps due to the expansive reading of
standing in ADA cases, defendants and courts alike appear reluctant to con-
test a disabled person's standing in an ADA Title III action.69 Nevertheless,
the doctrine of standing provides authority for the dismissal of lawsuits
where technical non-compliance has not caused a disabled person to suffer
an actual injury, while avoiding the pitfalls of the valuable guidance stan-
dard.
Congress explicitly stated that the failure to remove an architectural bar-
rier, for which it is readily achievable to remove, is a specific act of dis-
crimination under the ADA.'70 However, the statutory mandate that the fail-
ure to remove an architectural barrier constitutes discrimination does not
165. Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1082 (D. Haw. 2000).
166. Id. at 1082 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
167. Id. at 1083 (citing Delil v. El Torito Rests., Inc., No. C 94-3900 CAL, 1997 WL
714866, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 1997)). See also Vandermolen v. Roosevelt, No. 1:97CV
200, 1997 WL 853505 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 1997) (finding that plaintiff suffering from
physical and psychological maladies did not have standing to sue for accessibility claims re-
lating to wheelchair disabled, deaf, and blind persons).
168. See Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., I F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1153 (D. Or. 1998);
Pascuiti v. N.Y. Yankees, 87 F. Supp. 2d 221, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
169. Amy F. Robertson, Standing to Sue Under Title III of the ADA, 27 COLO. LAw 51,
51 (Mar. 1998) (noting that standing is raised only rarely in Title III cases).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2000).
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give any disabled person the right to bring a federal cause of action, since
the "[c]ongressional creation of a right does not eliminate the constitutional
requirement of standing to assert that right in court."'' Thus, "[t]he proper
analysis of standing focuses on whether the plaintiff suffered an actual in-
jury, not on whether a statute was violated ... [Congress] cannot confer
standing by statute alone.' ' 2
Accordingly, it is imperative for a plaintiff claiming a cause of action
under Title III of the ADA to show that (s)he has been legitimately ag-
grieved in order to have standing. In addition, since the only remedy avail-
able under the ADA is injunctive relief, a plaintiff alleging ADA violations
must demonstrate a "real and immediate threat" of repeated future harm to
satisfy the injury in fact prong of the standing test.'71 Simply put, a plaintiff
must show that (s)he is likely to be served by the defendant in the future and
that the defendant is apt to discriminate against him/her at that time.14 Thus,
when a plaintiff alleged pervasive and continuing ADA violations at a res-
taurant, but could not demonstrate that she was likely to go back to the res-
taurant and experience discrimination in the future, such plaintiff did not
have standing to sue. 175 Rigorous application of this standing requirement
will certainly discourage "professional plaintiffs" who file actions claiming
ADA violations in many places of public accommodation at which it is
highly unlikely that such persons will visit in the future.
Some innovative defendants have found an escape in the ADA's stand-
ing requirement of a real and immediate threat of future harm by performing
an immediate fix of all conditions that are not in accordance with the Acces-
sibility Standards.'76 For example, assume that a plaintiff brought a lawsuit
against a restaurant alleging discrimination because the restaurant only has
steps at its entrance, which are a barrier to wheelchair users. If the restaurant
were to immediately install a ramp in compliance -with the Accessibility
Standards, the defendant could bring a motion to dismiss, on grounds that
the installation of the ramp has eliminated the possibility that the plaintiff
will again encounter this barrier. Since the restaurant is now compliant, there
is no real and immediate threat of future harm, and therefore the plaintiff
171. Hoepfl v. Barlow, 906 F. Supp. 317, 322 (E.D. Vir. 1995).
172. Doe v. Nat'l Board of Medical Exam'rs, 199 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 1999).
173. Aikins v. St. Helena Hospital, No. C 93-3933 FMS, 1994 WL 794759, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 4, 1994).
174. Id.
175. DeLil v. El Torito Rests., No. C 94-3900-CAL, 1997 WL 714866, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
June 24, 1997); cf. Aikins, 1994 WL 794759, at *3 (denying defendant's motion to dismiss
because plaintiff frequently visits a location near the defendant's hospital and the court "con-
sider[ed] it reasonably possible that she might need to seek services from the hospital.").
176. See, e.g., Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Home Depot
U.S.A., Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Ad-
judication at 8, DiPrima v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 02CV-1448 RSWL (CWx) (C.D.
Cal. 2002) ("There is no injunctive relief that the Court can order because Home Depot is in
conformance with Plaintiff's requested injunctive relief.").
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lacks standing to bring a claim for injunctive relief, Title III's only available
remedy. 177
B. Rebuttable Presumption
In addition to a more rigorous application of standing, the authors also
advocate an approach alluded to in Access Now, Inc. v. South Florida Sta-
dium Corp. 7 1 that strikes the delicate balance in satisfying the countervailing
policies of providing a clear and consistent standard for existing facilities to
follow, but allows owners and operators of public accommodations an op-
portunity to avoid liability for technical non-compliance. The recommended
approach is a presumption that non-compliance with the Accessibility Stan-
dards is an architectural barrier. But, recognizing that the "ADA is a civil
rights law, not a building code,"'79 defendants may rebut this presumption by
proving that while not strictly compliant with the Accessibility Standards,
the alleged barrier did not discriminate against the plaintiff because his or
her full and equal enjoyment of the facility was not impaired. 8'
As the burden of proof is initially upon the plaintiff, this presumption al-
lows plaintiffs to meet his/her burden by demonstrating that because the de-
fendant's facility is not compliant with the Accessibility Standards, it con-
tains architectural barriers. This presumption is also beneficial for
defendants as owners of existing facilities can consult with the Accessibility
Standards to determine which, if any, of the conditions present are in viola-
tion of those standards and are therefore architectural barriers within the
meaning of Title III. Hence, owners and operators of places of public ac-
commodations can prevent lawsuits by simply following the Accessibility
Standards. In this way, the presumption that all violations of the Accessibil-
ity Standards in existing places of public accommodation are architectural
barriers creates a clear and consistent standard that meets Congress' man-
date.8 '
However, the greatest advantage of this presumption is that it can be re-
butted by evidence presented by the defendant showing that, although a fa-
cility did not comply with the Accessibility Standards, an architectural bar-
rier did not exist because the plaintiffs full and equal enjoyment'82 of the
177. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a) (2000).
178. 161 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1368 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (recognizing that "[d]eviation from the
standards is relevant but not determinative; it is one consideration from which the court may
conclude that noncompliance impedes access. At trial, a defendant may be able to rebut this
evidence by showing that despite the technical noncompliance, the challenged accommoda-
tion in fact allows disabled persons effective access.").
179. Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 745 (D. Or. 1997) sup-
plemented by 1 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Or. 1998) (explaining the DOJ's position in the case).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994) (Title III's general prohibition on discrimination).
181. See id. § 12101(b)(2).
182. Id. § 12182(a).
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facility was not impaired. '83 For example, if a restaurant's alleged van acces-
sible handicapped parking space has an access aisle that is 95 inches wide, it
has technically violated the Accessibility Standards, which require a 96-inch
wide access aisle.8" A defendant has a legitimate concern that a "profes-
sional plaintiff' might measure the parking space and then bring a lawsuit
against the restaurant, alleging that the one-inch deviation from the Accessi-
bility Standards was an architectural barrier. However, the defendant may
rebut the presumption by proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that the
plaintiff's full and equal enjoyment of the facility was not impaired by the 1-
inch deviation. If the violation did not impede or hamper the disabled per-
son's full and equal enjoyment of the facility, the defendant has successfully
rebutted the presumption and there is no architectural barrier. On the other
hand, if the 1-inch discrepancy did impair the disabled person's full and
equal enjoyment, this technical non-compliance is no longer de minimis,
since the plaintiff suffered a loss of equal use and enjoyment of the facility
as a result of the violation.
It is important to note that full and equal enjoyment, and not mere ac-
cessibility, is the desired goal of Title III of the ADA.185 Therefore, the de-
fendant cannot meet its burden of proving full and equal enjoyment by sim-
ply demonstrating that access is available in some manner, but must
recognize the qualitative nature of access. 86 When confronting issues of ra-
cial equality decades ago, this country recognized that one's civil rights tran-
scended simply being able to ride a bus, but went to the fullness and equality
of the accommodations. Similarly, equality is not achieved for a person with
a mobility impairment just because he/she is able to gain access to a facility
"with additional time, patience, and jockeying of the wheelchair."'87 There-
fore, when determining full and equal enjoyment of a facility under the
ADA, courts must consider not only whether the plaintiff may in some man-
ner achieve access, but also the equality of access. 8
The ability to rebut the presumption that failure to comply with the Ac-
cessibility Standards constitutes an architectural barrier provides the defen-
dant an "escape" from the strict requirements of the Accessibility Standards,
and satisfies the courts' previously-noted concerns that existing facilities
183. See Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; Denying Defen-
dant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 8-9, Moreno v. Vineeraaj, Inc., (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(No. 01-0363) (on file with author) (holding that because the defendant points to contradic-
tory expert "evidence that the counter height and seating access do not hinder use or enjoy-
ment of the facility."); D'Lil v. Stardust Vacation Club, No. CIV-S-00-1496DFL PAN, 2001
WL 1825832 *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21 2001) (recognizing that plaintiff must prove that the
facility "contained actual barriers that hindered her access.").
184. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, 4.6.3 (2002).
185. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
186. Boemio v. Love's Rest., 954 F. Supp. 204, 208 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (explaining equal
access under California's Unruh Civil Rights law).
187. Id.
188. Id.
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need to be held to a lesser standard than those applied to new construction
and altered facilities. Thus, the rebuttable presumption provides a clear and
consistent standard for the courts to follow, but on an individual basis, al-
lows the defendant to evade the rigid requirements of the Accessibility Stan-
dard if the defendant can prove that the violation did not, in fact, impair the
plaintiff's full and equal enjoyment of the facility.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite only being in existence for over a decade, the ADA has gained
vociferous critics because of its ambiguous language. In particular, courts
have struggled and continue to struggle to define the term "architectural bar-
riers." Both business owners and the disabled community are disadvantaged
by the various approaches adopted by the courts because of the lack of a
clear standard that results from vague terminology. Thus, the authors pro-
pose that defendants more rigorously challenge plaintiff's standing in ADA
Title III cases (with courts applying a friendly eye toward legitimate chal-
lenges), and that courts adopt a rebuttable presumption that the physical
characteristics of governed businesses that do not meet or exceed the techni-
cal requirements of the Accessibility Standards constitute architectural barri-
ers within the meaning of the ADA. Linking the presumption of inaccessibil-
ity to the Accessibility Standards effectively promotes genuinely accessible
facilities. On the other hand, permitting business owners to rebut this pre-
sumption, where appropriate, provides flexibility and fairness when the al-
leged violation of the law is a mere technicality.
Perhaps more importantly, application of this rebuttable presumption is
in accordance with the ADA's general purpose to "provide a clear and com-
prehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against in-
dividuals with disabilities" and "to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforce-
able standards."'89 To the extent that courts commit to tying barrier removal
obligations to the plainly read Accessibility Standards the business commu-
nity will more easily ascertain its responsibilities under this Act and more
quickly come into compliance with the provisions set forth therein. This will
open the doors of our Nation's businesses, providing increased opportunity
for the disabled community and unlocking a source of patronage for those
very businesses that currently are inaccessible to customers with disabili-
ties. 90
Finally, as the authors' proposal not only provides flexibility to business
owners but calls for the consistent application of the plainly worded but rig-
orous Accessible Standards, it will promote the laudable vision of the ADA,
as stated by Senator Harkin: "The American with Disabilities Act is a land-
189. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1), (2) (2000).
190. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 66 (1989), reprinted in BERNARD D. REAMS, JR. ET AL.,
DISABILITY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 PUBLIC LAW 101-336, Doc. No. 2 (1992).
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mark statement of human rights, which will, at long last, keep the promise of
'liberty and justice for all' to the nation's last large oppressed minority. '
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